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Abstract  
 
The basic concept of capital flight regarding how easy capital can move in cross-
border transactions of Adam Smith is one of the groundwork of this thesis. It cannot 
be denied that both developed countries and developing countries are facing the same 
problems regarding capital flight. However, European Union (EU) countries have 
been moving several steps further concerning cross-border transactions. Countries in 
EU has reached certain minimum standard of law enforcement in addressing Double 
Taxation problem within EU by helping each other through the recovery of tax claim 
directive, automatic exchange directive, and savings directive. 
 
This thesis will discuss the established EU directives regarding double taxation and 
double non-taxation issues in cross-border transactions compared to relatively-new 
Indonesian regulation in the same area. The idea is to highlight items that can be 
learned from the legal framework of EU directives to improve Indonesian tax 
collection system. Among many aspects of variety of taxes, the thesis will focus on 
direct taxes, particularly cross-border transactions. 
 
The main issue here is the scope of Indonesian’s tax regulation regarding cross-border 
transactions which is not as comprehensive as EU directives. The current 
Indonesian’s tax regulation cannot capture the urgency of automatic exchange of 
information between national tax authorities and other countries’ tax authorities. The 
issue of revealing bank secrecy related to tax is also a hinder for the identification of 
taxpayer’s condition which makes the exchange of information become difficult.  
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5 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1  International Capital Flight 
 
The phenomenon of international juridical double taxation can be generally defined as 
“The imposition of comparable taxes in two (or more) States on the same taxpayer in 
respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods.”1 This phenomenon takes 
places when there is transaction that involves more than one country or in other word 
‘cross-border transaction’. 
 
Cross-border transactions between countries require a Double Tax Treaty that 
produces a balanced allocation of taxing power between countries and ensures 
national tax sovereignty is not compromised. Adam Smith had a view that the nature 
of capital will opt to “abandon any country if the need arose”. This is what 
encourages every country to be engaged in agreement with other countries, to prevent 
the risk of losing the ability to tax that may resulting in compromised tax sovereignty.  
 
“The paradox is that international capital in fact does not flow to poorer countries, 
because tax advantages are unable to compensate for all other disadvantages (lack of 
infrastructure, etc.), related to the investment in such countries. The outcome is that 
poorer countries still end up in having limited fiscal capacity, which prevents them 
from disposing over revenue to fund their infrastructure and policies for economic 
development. Alternatively, such countries are obliged to search for revenue by taxing 
non-mobile persons, who often are striving to survive and have little or no ability to 
pay.”2 
 
1.2  Background 
 
In EU, Member States have the right to conclude tax treaties with other Member 
States, as well as with non-Member States. Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) plays an important role in in constructing Tax Treaties to 
the Member States of EU since most of OECD Member States are also EU Member 
States. As Pistone stated “OECD member countries usually have strong tax treaty 
negotiating powers, due to their own international prestige, economic power, or 
proximity to the average needs of a powerful block of countries with similar 
international tax policy goals, and this power usually allows them to impose their tax 
treaty provisions in their tax treaties”.3 Contrast to OECD Member States, developing 
countries show the opposite. The weak negotiation power due to poverty, low rate of 
economic growth and development, can affect tax treaty policy in developing 
countries. Instead of preventing double taxation by allocating taxing powers fairly, 
developing countries ended up on lowering effective tax rate, giving relief, and 
interfering the national tax policies.  
 
As mentioned earlier, OECD Member States usually have a strong tax treaty 
negotiating power, and whenever they may engage in a Model Tax Convention 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Report of The OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and On Capital (1977) 
2 Pasquale Pistone, Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics, IBFD, (2010) 419 
3 Pasquale Pistone, Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics, IBFD, (2010) 414 
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(MTC), the OECD Member State may have a contribution in shaping the MTC. By 
contrast, the developing countries which are ‘generally poorer’ than their 
counterparts, will likely choose to grant tax concessions to other contracting states in 
order to attract Foreign Direct Investment. The stronger contracting state in the tax 
treaty (in this case OECD Member States) has strong influence to exercise the 
negotiating power to reach their goal, which is “to impose their tax treaty provisions 
in their tax treaties.”4 And the developing countries may suffer the weak protection of 
their international tax policy needs. The situation of developing countries is getting 
worse when they are engaged into a tax treaty and it is not limited to tax treaties 
conducted with OECD Member States, but with any country that has better economic 
situation and strong negotiating power. This scenario describes how two countries 
with different condition can lead to different outcome from the same treaty.  
 
In particular, even though tax treaties can bring different effect in relation to which 
country is engaged on the bilateral tax treaty, tax treaty would still be the instrument 
for OECD Member States to “make it possible to obtain all relevant information that 
is needed in order to achieve a correct levy of taxes”5 and tax treaty is also the 
instrument that can be used to exercise the taxing powers and protect the need of 
developing countries to collect the revenue. 
 
1.3  Purpose 
 
Based on the difference in effect brought by the tax treaty regarding developing 
country’s weak negotiation power, it is important for the author to learn from 
European Union countries, on how to overcome double taxation and double non 
taxation phenomenon by engaging in tax treaty since this will make the collection of 
revenue possible without improperly overburdening the worker and attract foreign 
investment by giving inappropriate and unfair relief to foreign direct investment. 
 
It is necessary to learn from EU member states because EU have been through a 
process of transformation starting from the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and it has been one of the prominent metamorphoses in the modern times.6 Referring 
to the Neo-functionalist theory, “today’s EU is an altogether different, quasi-
constitutional, federal-entity” 7  EU also has deep and broad capacity of creating, 
interpreting and enforcing rules which resulting in a “supranational governance”8 and 
the capacity has been steadily upgraded and producing a denser and more articulated 
rules which is able to cover and expanding range of substantive domains. The 
amplification of supranational governance in the EU has been considered as “one of 
the most remarkable political innovations in the world in the past half-century and a 
social science puzzle of the first order.”9 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Pasquale Pistone, Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics, IBFD, (2010) 414 
5 Pasquale Pistone, Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics, IBFD, (2010) 429 
6  Weiler in Stone Sweet, Alec and Sandholtz, Wayne, Neofunctionalism and Supranational 
Governance, (April 6, 2010), Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585123  
7 Burley and Mattli in Stone Sweet, Alec and Sandholtz, Wayne, Neofunctionalism and Supranational 
Governance, (April 6, 2010), Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585123 
8 Stone Sweet, Alec and Sandholtz, Wayne, Neofunctionalism and Supranational Governance, (April 
6, 2010), Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585123 
9 Stone Sweet, Alec and Sandholtz, Wayne, Neofunctionalism and Supranational Governance, (April 
6, 2010), Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585123 
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Indonesia is a developing country that is actively engaged in treaty negotiation. 
Taxpayers in Indonesia are subject to taxation on their worldwide income. It means 
that tax authority may impose tax on income that takes place outside the territory of 
Indonesia. However, there is no right arising for the tax administrators to exercise 
their power outside the territory of its state. Therefore, there will be no guarantee for a 
state with the World Wide Income principle that the tax paid on income that takes 
place outside the country has been taxed appropriately.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to describe Indonesian national tax law issue and how to 
address the problem of double taxation and double non-taxation that will likely arise 
in cross-border transactions in general by learning from countries in European Union 
addressing the same issue, given that Indonesia as a developing country has its own 
challenges which are potentially become impediment for the government to improve 
and optimize the tax collection system.   
 
1.4  Method and materials 
 
The method utilized in the thesis is comparative legal research in which the author 
will analyze the legal frameworks of recovery of collection directive, automatic 
exchange directive and savings directive in EU and mutual agreement procedure in 
Indonesia.  
 
Due to the complexity of understanding the rules, several secondary sources have 
been also utilized. The materials used have been mainly doctrinal articles and 
literature, which are mainly in English. The author have studied and examined both 
international and domestic source, due to the urgency of describing the figure in 
Indonesia’s, there are some references to several Indonesia’s institutions which have 
been crucial in describing Indonesian’s domestic tax law. Additionally, I have also 
utilized a Swedish database which is lagen.nu in order to access Swedish primary law, 
nonetheless, the information obtained has been supported with secondary source 
database which is IBFD in order to make it understandable by non-Swedish readers.  
 
1.5  Delimitation 
 
In consideration of the wide scope of cross-border transactions, this thesis will be 
subject to several delimitations. 
 
Firstly, the focus on the thesis won’t be specifically concerning one particular cross-
border transaction. Moreover, the thesis will provide a general description of current 
Indonesian’s regulation which is dealing with cross-border transaction and how the 
elements of the regulation does not have clear concept of defining tax activities 
related to cross-border transaction and creates loopholes for the taxpayers to conduct 
tax avoidance or worse, tax evasion. On the contrary, EU context of mutual 
agreement procedure requires specific definition of each activities, or if it is not 
specified, EU context sets delimitation that could force one transaction to be taxed 
somewhere.  
 
Furthermore, among several types of tax treaties including unilateral tax treaties, 
bilateral tax treaties, and multilateral tax treaties, only bilateral tax treaties will be 
analyzed. 
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1.6  Outline  
 
This thesis has been divided into different sections which will further explains 
different aspects related to cross-border transaction and Double Tax Convention 
(DTC) in EU countries and in developing countries especially Indonesia. This outline 
will provide short introduction to every chapter in this thesis in order to give guidance 
for the reader.  
 
The first chapter will provide background, purpose and aim of the thesis. The second 
chapter will explain cross-border transactions and double tax treaties in general as a 
tool which commonly used between countries to coordinate the exercise of taxing 
rights. Chapter three stands as a starting point to illustrate what are the issues that will 
likely arise in developing country’s when it comes to cross-border transactions in 
accordance to the effort made by Indonesia to attract foreign direct investment. 
 
The fourth chapter gives further explanation on methods to eliminate double taxation 
that are utilized by EU, Indonesian, and other countries. This chapter will 
comprehensively explain the savings directive, automatic exchange directives, and the 
recovery of collection directive. Finally, the fifth chapter which is the last chapter will 
highlight several aspects in Indonesian regulation that needs improvement that can be 
learned from EU.  
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2. Cross-border Transaction 
 
2.1 A Note on Terminology10 
 
Several national tax systems make a difference between tax evasion which involves a 
taxpayer who escapes from tax liability that has already arisen (criminal matter), and 
the avoidance of tax liability that have not otherwise arisen (not a criminal matter, 
however, might potentially resulting in tax penalty). 11  Tax evasion involves, for 
example mis-reporting of income tax return, which is considered as a fraud. Even 
though not all tax systems clearly distinct this matter, it is preferable to comprehend 
that tax fraud involves criminal conduct, while tax avoidance might be unacceptable, 
but does not involve criminal conduct.12 
 
Several tax treaties are aimed to ‘the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention 
of fiscal evasion’.13 While in reality, the exchange of information provisions in tax 
treaties are generally used to counter tax avoidance rather than tax evasion, on the 
other hand, Mutual Legal Assistance convention relating to co-operation in criminal 
matters is used more as a basis for administrative assistance in the investigation and 
prosecution of criminal offences.14  
 
2.2 Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance 
 
There are several forms of tax evasion and tax avoidance in cross-border transactions. 
The OECD Report of International Tax Avoidance and Evasion stated that: “Tax 
Avoidance (…) is of concern to governments because such practices are contrary to 
fiscal equity, have serious budgetary effects and distort international competition and 
capital flows.”15 And on its report in 1987, OECD stated tax evasion as “an action by 
the taxpayer which entails breaking the law and which moreover can be shown to 
have been taken with the intention of escaping payment of tax.”16 Or in other words, a 
definition of tax evasion is: “The taxpayer avoids the payment of tax without avoiding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Philip Baker, Improper use of Tax Treaties, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion, in in United Nations 
Handbook on Selected Issues in Administration of Double Tax Treaties for Developing Countries, 
(2013), p. 385 - 387 
11 Philip Baker, Improper use of Tax Treaties, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion, in in United Nations 
Handbook on Selected Issues in Administration of Double Tax Treaties for Developing Countries, 
(2013), p. 385 
12 Philip Baker, Improper use of Tax Treaties, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion, in in United Nations 
Handbook on Selected Issues in Administration of Double Tax Treaties for Developing Countries, 
(2013), p. 385-386 
13 Philip Baker, Improper use of Tax Treaties, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion, in in United Nations 
Handbook on Selected Issues in Administration of Double Tax Treaties for Developing Countries, 
(2013), p. 386, see also Title to the United Nations Model Convention, footnote 7 
14 Philip Baker, Improper use of Tax Treaties, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion, in in United Nations 
Handbook on Selected Issues in Administration of Double Tax Treaties for Developing Countries, 
(2013), p. 386 
15 OECD Report on International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, para. 10 
16 Chris Finnerty, Paulus Merks, Mario Petriccione, Raffaele Russo, Fundamentals of International Tax 
Planning, (2007), IBFD Publications BV, p. 49 
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the tax liability, so that he escapes the payment of tax that is unquestionably due 
according to the law of the taxing jurisdiction and even breaks the letter of the law.”17 
 
However, tax avoidance usually comes in the form of profit shifting. The scheme 
generally occurs by shifting profits to lower-tax jurisdictions and deductible costs to 
high-tax jurisdictions. The other forms of tax avoidance are allocating debt and 
earnings stripping. With this method, intercompany lends and borrows to allocate 
costs and profits. In the case of company in a low-tax jurisdiction lends money to a 
group company in a high-tax jurisdiction, this will constitute the low-tax jurisdiction 
to impose tax on the interest, and deductible costs will be recognized in high-tax 
jurisdiction, which resulting in benefits for the company from the difference in 
taxation. The next method that is done by the company is transfer pricing on sales of 
goods and services between group companies. In low-tax jurisdictions, the group 
companies will increase the price, while it will lower the price on high-tax 
jurisdictions, thus, profits can be shifted. For tax purposes related to intercompany 
sales, the same price will be charged to unrelated-parties to comply with arms-length 
principle. However, when there is no third-party sale, in order to encourage fair 
intercompany price, the company will use the price of similar goods or a cost plus 
industry average profit markup, although this method will be challenging to do in new 
intangibles. The other form of tax avoidance is using hybrid instruments which is 
created to avoid tax by being treated as debt in one jurisdiction and equity in another, 
for example an entity that is considered as a corporation in one jurisdiction but 
recognized as a partnership in another jurisdiction for tax purposes to achieve the 
benefit resulting from different treatment in different jurisdiction.18  
 
From the previous explanation, it can be seen that the difficulty is not about defining 
tax evasion, it is about drawing a line between tax avoidance and tax planning. The 
starting point to determine which one is tax avoidance and tax planning is principle pf 
freedom of contract, which says “taxpayers are free to arrange their affairs as they 
wish in order to save taxes”19 The other principle to be taken into consideration is 
principle of legal certainty, which provides a condition when a taxpayer legally 
entering a transaction, they should be able to trust that transaction, and the tax 
authorities and the court should also respect the transaction. 
 
2.3 Solution : National Anti Avoidance Rules And Bilateral Tax Treaties  
 
Tax evasion and tax avoidance are impediments for a government that causing a 
country lost its revenue from tax. Most of the countries have several measures to 
combat tax evasion and tax avoidance, it can be done through unilateral, bilateral, or 
multilateral measures. Unilateral measure that may prevent the tax avoidance are 
national General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAARs).20 “General anti-avoidance rules are 
domestic rules that allow the tax authorities to re-characterize a transaction or a series 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Chris Finnerty, Paulus Merks, Mario Petriccione, Raffaele Russo, Fundamentals of International Tax 
Planning, (2007), IBFD Publications BV, p. 50 
18  Robert F. van Brederode, ‘A Normative Evaluation of Tax Law Enforcement: Legislative and 
Political Responses to Tax Avoidance and Evasion’ (2014) 42 Intertax, Issue 12, p. 769 
19 Chris Finnerty, Paulus Merks, Mario Petriccione, Raffaele Russo, Fundamentals of International Tax 
Planning, (2007), IBFD Publications BV, p. 52 
20 Michael Lang; Peter Melz; and Eleonor Kristoffersson, Value Added Tax and Direct Taxation – 
Similarities and Differences, (2009), IBFD, p. 1137 
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of transactions that have been entered with the (sole or main) purpose of obtaining 
undue tax benefits. Many domestic tax systems contain such rules, either in the form 
of an express provision incorporated into the tax code or in the form of a general 
principle of abuse of law, generally developed by local judges in domestic case 
law.”21 Before GAARs was introduced, unilateral measure to avoid double taxation 
was done by one of the states involved in cross-border transaction which was 
withdrawing its tax claim, and the other form was through the allowance of 
exemptions, for example by exempting foreign income if that income was already 
taxed in source country. The coverage area of general anti-avoidance is different from 
one jurisdiction to other jurisdiction, and it also depends on whether in one 
jurisdiction there will be tax benefit obtained, and that the loss of tax revenue could 
affect business in other contracting states. These differences constitute three 
considerations for companies in evaluating the risk of establishing business in other 
country to minimize the tax burden.22  
 
However, those forms of unilateral measures are considered insufficient to avoid 
double taxation because they were not able to cover the whole issues that arise prior 
to cross-border transactions.23 In European Union, GAARs is recommended to be 
adopted domestically by the EU Member States to combat tax avoidance in domestic 
and cross-border transactions with other Member States or transaction involving third 
countries. There are many forms of domestic anti-avoidance rules regarding taxation 
in European Union countries. For example, United Kingdom has Thin Cap rules and 
Controlled Foreign Company rules (CFC Rules) which goal is to prevent artificial 
arrangements in cross-border transactions. CFC rules targets one form of act in 
avoiding tax by using fictitious arrangements where a company establishing a 
business without genuine economic activity in other Member State. While United 
Kingdom has specific category of anti-avoidance rules, Sweden has its GAARs which 
is more general in addition to CFC and transfer pricing rules. According to the 
extraction of Sweden’s anti-avoidance rules, a transaction that is deemed as an act of 
tax avoidance may be eliminated if following conditions are fulfilled: 
1.   “The transaction results in a significant tax benefit for the taxpayer; 
2.   The taxpayer is, directly or indirectly, a party to the transaction; 
3.   Such a tax benefit is assumed to have been the predominant reason for the 
transaction; and 
4.   Taxation on the basis of the transaction would be in violation of the purposes 
of law”24 
 
2.4 National Measures To Guarantee Tax Collection Are Limited 
 
On 26 October 2005, The Commission of The European Communities issued 
Communication regarding coordination between Member States’ direct tax system in 
the Internal market, where It stated that direct tax system remain in the competence of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Chris Finnerty, Paulus Merks, Mario Petriccione, Raffaele Russo, Fundamentals of International Tax 
Planning, (2007), IBFD Publications BV, p. 207 
22 Chris Finnerty, Paulus Merks, Mario Petriccione, Raffaele Russo, Fundamentals of International Tax 
Planning, (2007), IBFD Publications BV, p. 208 
23  Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, (1986), Berkeley Journal of 
International Law Volume 4 Issue 1 Spring, p. 9 
24 Lag Mot Skatteflykt (SFS 1995:575), translation provided by IBFD, Laura Ambagtsheer-Pakarinen, 
Sweden – Corporate Taxation, IBFD, (2015) 
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Member States in order to meet its domestic policy objectives. However, national tax 
law might create unequal treatment in cross-border transaction and also double 
taxation, which might lead to be obstacle of the Internal Market in EU. Therefore, 
these problems can be addressed by bilateral tax treaties to overcome the obstacles 
that cannot be solved by unilateral measure. The Commission believes that 
mismatches between Member States’ tax system which could lead to double taxation 
and double non taxation due to lack of co-ordination, can be fixed by appropriate co-
ordination and co-operation between Member States to meet their tax policy goals and 
protect their tax revenue and prevent double taxation or double non taxation.25  
  
2.5 The Complexities of Cross-border Transactions 
 
Dealing with cross border transaction may present obstacles to contracting parties. 
The author has mentioned that European Union Member States have strong 
negotiation power, and they even have the influence to shape the MTC. However, 
there are challenges that even EU Member States have to encounter, for instance 
language barriers causing every country that has entered into an agreement with other 
country who uses different language need to hire a skillful translator, not only it is a 
costly expense, it also not necessarily guarantee the translator is able to sufficiently 
provide the actual meaning and purpose of a regulation. The difference in legal 
systems, tax regimes, and accounting regimes in cross-border transactions impose 
challenges not only for the government and tax authority, but also to the investors 
who want to start their business abroad. “Different legal systems require that the 
investor consider a variety of new issues and develop strategies or dealing with each. 
Examples include: (i) higher levels of disclosure to regulatory authorities in the US 
than elsewhere; (ii) differing behavioral standards (…); (iii) minimum amounts of 
capital required to be invested by the foreign partner (eg 20 per cent of the initial 
joint venture capital in the Ukraine and 5 per cent in Indonesia); (iv) requirements of 
local purchase or manufacture, such as is the case in China; (v) restrictions on 
acquiring certain assets, such as land in Poland; (vi) the absence of any effective 
means of enforcement of legal rights, as in Russia and, (vii) different degrees of 
recognition afforded to intellectual property right, such as patent infringement and 
counterfeiting.”26  
In this regards, contracting parties in a tax treaty are expected to improve the 
communication between them to address the complexities in different legal system 
problems that will likely arise when cross-border transactions take place.  
 
2.6 Double Tax Treaties and Domestic Law 
 
“A double tax treaty is an agreement between states to coordinate the exercise of their 
taxing rights. Although it is between states, it has direct effect towards taxpayers. 
They can invoke treaty benefits and therefore request the application of treaty 
provisions.”27 Generally tax treaties are made based on the Model. The most common 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Commission of The European Communities, Communication From The Commission to The Council, 
The European Parliament and The European Economic and Social Committee regarding Co-
ordination Member States’ Direct Tax Systems in The Internal Market, 25 October 2006. 
26 Arthur H Rosenbloom and Stephan H Haimo, Cross Border Transactions: Look Before you Leap, 
(1997) Business Law Review, p.257 
27 Chris Finnerty, Paulus Merks, Mario Petriccione, Raffaele Russo, Fundamentals of International Tax 
Planning, (2007), IBFD Publications BV, p. 11 
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used are OECD Model and the UN Models. Each Model have commentaries that 
functioned to give further explanation on how to implement the provisions, and are 
normally updated on periodical basis, considering the rapid changes in economy and 
developments. OECD Model designed for a negotiation between developed countries 
while UN Models is designed for negotiation between developed and developing 
countries, which it tends to facilitate broader taxing rights to the source state.28  
 
Regarding the relation between double tax treaties and domestic law, there are two 
issues to be considered. The first one is how tax treaties do not generate the taxing 
rights. Double tax treaties create limitation on how each contracting state exercise 
their taxing rights once they are engaged in tax treaties. However, it is still domestic 
law, which constitutes taxing rights, and double tax treaty’s role is to limit the taxing 
rights. The second consideration is that occasionally there will be difference found in 
definitions between double tax treaties and domestic law. For instance one particular 
type of income that is considered as royalty in domestic law does not automatically 
will also be considered as royalty in double tax treaty. Furthermore, the appropriate 
steps to be done when looking at the consequences of a cross-border transactions are 
too: “(i) determine the tax treatment on the basis of the applicable domestic legislation 
and (ii) verify whether and to what extent the relevant tax treaty has an impact on 
it.”29 
 
2.7 Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) 
 
(TIEAs) is a model agreement on exchange of information on tax matters, which is 
developed by the OECD Global Forum Working Group on Effective Exchange if 
Information, which purpose is to promote international co-operation in tax matters 
through exchange of information.30 TIEAs came into force after the 1998 OECD 
Report “Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue” and that report 
identified “the lack of effective of exchange of information” as an issue in harmful tax 
competition.31 This model agreement is not binding, however it contains two models 
for bilateral agreements, which are intended to establish criteria that determine 
effective exchange on formation. Each Article is accompanied with detailed 
commentary to interpret the provisions 
 
2.8 The United Nations Model Convention and OECD Model Convention 
 
United Nations (UN) Model Convention manifests the notion where a residence 
country should extend the measure to relief double taxation issue through foreign tax 
credit or an exemption, which is similar to OECD Model Convention. However, there 
are three considerations taken into account by United Nations Model Convention in 
balancing its approach to facilitate the negotiation, interpretation and practical 
application of bilateral tax treaties which are: “(a) taxation of income from foreign 
capital should take into account expenses allocable to the earnings of the income so 
that such income is taxed on a net basis, that (b) taxation should not be so high as to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Chris Finnerty, Paulus Merks, Mario Petriccione, Raffaele Russo, Fundamentals of International Tax 
Planning, (2007), IBFD Publications BV, p. 11 
29 Chris Finnerty, Paulus Merks, Mario Petriccione, Raffaele Russo, Fundamentals of International Tax 
Planning, (2007), IBFD Publications BV, p. 13 
30 OECD Report on Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters, para (1) Preamble 
31 OECD Report on Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters, para (3) Preamble 
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discourage investment and that (c) it should take into account the appropriateness of 
the sharing of revenue with the country providing the capital”. 32  United Nations 
Model Convention’s consideration that lowering tax rate is an effective method to 
attract investment is not appropriate since lowering tax rate is not always coherent 
with attracting direct investment and without analyzing the condition of a country, 
and the implications of applicable provisions in the treaty could potentially harm 
national sovereignty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 United National Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, 
(2011), p. ix 
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3. Developing Country’s Issues in Cross-border 
transaction 
 
3.1 Developing Country Handles Tax Collection in Cross-border Transaction 
 
It is acknowledged that tax evasion and non-compliance behavior of Indonesian 
taxpayer is on the rise. The issue of high compliance cost because of the complexity 
of tax administration and uncertainty in the domestic tax law itself, corruption cases 
that involved tax authorities, less effective strategy in collecting tax by granting tax 
incentives to attract foreign direct investment and targeting income tax on individuals 
who have low income have affected taxpayers’ compliance and behavior creating lack 
of respect toward tax law and tax authorities which in the long term decrease the 
effectiveness of tax collection. The objective of domestic tax law in Indonesia as well 
as the rest of the country in the world is to increase tax revenue.  
 
The fact that Indonesia is a developing country, it depends on foreign investor to 
develop economic growth. Types of incentives given by the tax authorities to foreign 
investor come in the form of tax holidays, which gives exemption on certain 
activities, tax rate reduction, deductible expenses and tax credits.  However, instead of 
strengthening tax administration and tax compliance behavior, double tax treaties to 
which Indonesia took part resulting in inefficient tax collection. OECD Report on 
Corporate Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries 
mentioned that there have been several empirical studies to review the significance of 
tax incentives in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The Report showed that 
it is indeed that tax incentives influence FDI, nevertheless, not all tax incentives will 
actually influence the FDI, there were tax incentives that even disadvantageous.  
 
3.2 Challenges in Indonesia’s Tax System 
 
Indonesian authorities have set up ambitious development targets as well as tax target 
as the financial support for the development, especially in order to enhance the 
infrastructure and to expand social safety net, which need conspicuous amount of 
financial support. Simultaneously, there will be political demand for improvements in 
public goods provided by the government as well as social security programs. Not to 
miss the need of a change toward a greener economy will be an additional 
expenditure needs. The variety of these objectives requires more public revenues and 
this is the principal challenges for Indonesian tax system in the future.33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Jens Arnold, Improving the Tax System in Indonesia, OECD Economics Department Working Papers 
No. 998, (2012) p. 5 
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Source : OECD Revenue Statistics, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Government 
Finance Statistics, Indonesia Ministry of Finance, Philippines Department of Finance  
 
Indonesia has the lowest ratio of general government tax revenues to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in The Group of Twenty (G20) countries34  which are Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. As a comparison, other 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries could collect more than 
15% of GDP in tax revenues in 2009, while the average OECD countries were at 
33,8% GDP excluding non-tax revenues.35  
 
Even though Indonesia has revised the tax revenue target by lowering from IDR 
1.280, 38 trillion (EUR 90 Million) to IDR 1.246,1 trillion (EUR 85 Million), 
however, until the end of 2014, the realization of tax revenue was not able to fulfill 
the target.  
 
3.3 Tax Incentive as a Tool to Attract Foreign Investment 
 
The development that is performed by a State requires high cost. Apart from within 
the country, another source of funding can be obtained from foreign country, which 
comes in the form of foreign investment. There are several tools that can be use to 
attract foreign investment. Gergely mentioned that there are several types of 
incentives that are rendered to attract investment, such as fiscal incentive (tax 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Jens Arnold, Improving the Tax System in Indonesia, OECD Economics Department Working Papers 
No. 998, (2012) p. 5 
35 Jens Arnold, Improving the Tax System in Indonesia, OECD Economics Department Working Papers 
No. 998, (2012) p. 5 
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incentive), financial incentive (subsidies), and other type of incentives (such as 
market protection).36 
 
However there are few differences between the incentives given by the developing 
countries and by the developed countries. Developed countries opt to use financial 
incentives in the form of subsidies while developing countries prefer to give tax 
incentive.37 The differences arise because most of the developing countries do not 
have sufficient funding that can be allocated for giving subsidies. 38  Goodspeed 
indicates that more than half of 71 developing countries prefer to use tax incentive, 
and the remaining 20% of the developing countries opt to give subsidies. In 
comparison, from 20 OECD Member States, there is 45% who prefer to give 
subsidies and 20% opts to offer tax incentive in order to attract foreign investment.39  
 
There are considerable reason that lead to above differences, which are40: firstly, it is 
easer to give tax incentives, compared to overcoming the deficiency of economic 
fundamentals such as infrastructure and labor issues. Secondly, tax incentives do not 
require funds directly as granting a subsidy. Lastly, the existence of competition with 
other countries in order to attract foreign investment.  
 
The author will primarily describe theoretical study over tax incentives which is then 
followed by the historical studies on tax incentives that have already been applied in 
Indonesia. In comparison, there will be an explanation on similar program carried out 
in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
 
3.4 What is Tax Incentive? 
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines tax 
incentives as “…any incentives that reduce the tax burden of enterprises in order to 
induce them to invest in particular projects or sectors.” 41  Easson gives another 
definition stating that essentially, tax incentive is “…a special tax provisions granted 
to qualified investment projects … that represents a statutorily favorable deviation 
from a corresponding provision applicable in investment projects in general.” 42 
Based on the definition above, it can be concluded that tax incentive is basically the 
deviation of tax provisions which are generally applicable. Tax incentive is usually 
given accompanied by certain requirements, such as a company must establish its 
business in particular location, limitation on business turnover, and requirement for 
the company to create technology transfer. The requirement might also come in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Judith Gergely, Trends in Foreign Direct Investment Incentives, European Communities Studies 
Association Working Paper, (2003) 
37 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Tax Incentives and Foreign 
Direct Investment: A Global Survey, ASIT Advisory Studies No. 16 (2000) 
38 Timothy Goodspeed, Taxation and FDI in Developed and Developing Countries,  in James Alm, 
Jorge Martines-Vazques and Mak Rider (eds), The Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy 
(Springer, 2006), 137 
39 Timothy Goodspeed, Taxation and FDI in Developed and Developing Countries,  in James Alm, 
Jorge Martines-Vazques and Mak Rider (eds), The Challenges of Tax Reform in a Global Economy 
(Springer, 2006), 137 
40 Nargiza Yakubova, Policy Matters: Tax Incentives for Business Investment, European Journal of 
Business and Economics, (2013) 
41 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Tax Incentives and Foreign 
Direct Investment: A Global Survey, ASIT Advisory Studies No. 16 (2000) 
42 A. J. Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment, Kluwer Law International, (2004) 
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form of demand that the profit of company is not distributed in the form of shares, 
instead, it should be re-invested in particular project or period.  
 
UNCTAD also stated that there several goals to be achieved in granting tax 
incentives, namely:43  
1.   To increase investment in certain areas 
2.   To increase investment in certain business sectors 
3.   To increase the performance 
4.   Technology transfer 
 
To achieve the above purposes, there are several types of tax incentives that normally 
used. For example, in the context of achieving technology transfer, tax incentive that 
is given is in the form of accelerated depreciation, reduction of withholding tax on 
dividends or royalties, or in the form of tax holiday.44  
 
Tax holiday is considered as “the most convenient” of all alternatives since taxpayers 
are not required to calculate the amount of tax payable during the period of tax 
holiday. Nevertheless, developing countries prefer to reduce the income tax rates 
followed by tax holiday and developed countries opt to use accelerated depreciation.45 
Most of these incentives are given to certain sectors (e.g. manufacturing, 
infrastructure), certain areas (the areas that are considered to be less developed), or to 
export-oriented industries (mainly used in the developing countries).46 
 
Notwithstanding many countries provide tax incentives, in fact it is still remains a 
contention whether tax incentives have had a significant influence to increase 
investment. One might state that there is possibility that the granting of tax incentives 
can attract foreign investment in certain conditions. However, on the other hand, even 
without such incentives, investment will still occur, and what happens is a state 
loosing the tax revenue without obtaining benefit of any kind. It also important to 
consider that tax incentive could lead to tax avoidance47 by round tripping, double 
dipping, and transfer pricing.48 Especially, developing countries have the issue in 
which the ability of tax authorities to conduct supervision is relatively limited.49 As a 
consequence, there are debates stating that tax incentive would only erode tax bases 
and not necessarily attracts investment significantly.50 This is supported by a research 
conducted by Stefan Parys and Sebastian James in Africa, which shows that there is 
no positive correlation between the granting of tax holiday and investment.51 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Tax Incentives and Foreign 
Direct Investment: A Global Survey, ASIT Advisory Studies No. 16 (2000) 
44 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Tax Incentives and Foreign 
Direct Investment: A Global Survey, ASIT Advisory Studies No. 16 (2000) 
45 Nargiza Yakubova, Policy Matters: Tax Incentives for Business Investment, European Journal of 
Business and Economics, (2013) 
46 Nargiza Yakubova, Policy Matters: Tax Incentives for Business Investment, European Journal of 
Business and Economics, (2013) 
47 Nargiza Yakubova, Policy Matters: Tax Incentives for Business Investment, European Journal of 
Business and Economics, (2013) 
48 Alex Easson and Eric M. Zolt, Tax Incentives, World Bank Institute (2003), p. 16 
49 Nargiza Yakubova, Policy Matters: Tax Incentives for Business Investment, European Journal of 
Business and Economics, (2013) 
50 Alex Easson and Eric M. Zolt, Tax Incentives, World Bank Institute (2003), p. 16 
51 Stefan Parys and Sebastian James, The Effectiveness of Tax Incentives in Attracting Investment: 
Panel Data Evidence from the CFA Franc Zone, International Tax and Public Finance, (2010), p. 400 
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Most investors are inclined to think that an overall tax system in a country is often 
more important than tax incentives offered.52 What is considered as an important 
factors are legal certainty, simplicity of tax system and transparency. In this case, tax 
incentive is only treated as an additional bonus. Therefore, Yakubova suggested that 
simplifying the tax system is what is needed to be done, reduce the distortion caused 
by taxes, eliminating unnecessary cost of administration and cost of compliance, 
increase the transparency, and improve the ability of government in collecting the 
revenue.53 This is what has been done in Indonesia while conducting the tax reform in 
the 1980s.  
 
In the research, Klemm and Van Parys found that tax incentive has no correlation to 
foreign investment in Africa, however, in America and Caribia, reduced tax rate and 
tax holiday had given significant influence on increased foreign investment.54 This 
indicates that tax incentives is beneficial in certain condition and the policy makers 
need to pay attention on designing the tax incentive.55 Starting from the selection of 
the business sector in which the tax incentive will be given, that sector should have 
sensitive nature, for example to the services sector and retail.56 
The incentives could also be designed for the research and development. However, it 
should be noted that tax incentive will not be able to significantly boost the research 
and development in a company that had never perform such activities.57 For this type 
of company, it will be more effective if the incentive is given in the form of financial 
incentive.58 
 
The importance of designing tax incentive can be seen in Hong Kong and Singapore 
which relatively prosperous by relying on tax (even though there are fundamental 
difference between these two countries).59 In this context, Hong Kong choose to not 
give tax incentive and it prefers to design its tax system with low tax rates for all 
taxpayers. This condition support the realization of relatively simple tax system.60 As 
a result, there is no significant difference between the foreign investment that goes to 
Hong Kong and foreign investment that goes to Thailand which has more liberal tax 
incentive policy.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Nargiza Yakubova, Policy Matters: Tax Incentives for Business Investment, European Journal of 
Business and Economics, (2013) 
53 Nargiza Yakubova, Policy Matters: Tax Incentives for Business Investment, European Journal of 
Business and Economics, (2013) 
54  Alexander Klemm and S. Van Parys, Empirical Evidence on The Effects of Tax Incentives, 
International Tax and Public Finance, (2012), p. 393 
55 Alex Easson and Eric M. Zolt, Tax Incentives, World Bank Institute (2003), p. 16 
56  Andrew Hanson and Shawn Rohlin, Do Location-based Tax Incentives Attract New Business 
Establishment?, Journal of Public Economics, (2002), p. 1 
57 Nick Bloom, Rachel Griffith and John Van Reenen, Do R&D Tax Credits Work? Evidence from a 
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China: Local Institutions, regionalism, Global Systems and Economic Development, Routledge, 
(2012), p. 191 
60 M. Littlewood, Taxation without Representation: The History of Hongkong’s Troublingly Successful 
Tax System, Hongjong University Press, (2010) 
 
 
20 
On the contrary, Singapore in its initial two decades after gaining the independence, 
tend to be easier in giving incentives. Nevertheless, the granting of incentives in 
Singapore began to prove less effective. Currently, Singapore is in the transformation 
towards knowledge-based economy so that the incentives now are more aligned to 
support the transformation. Hence, it can be seen that the granting of tax incentives 
have been designed according to the long-term goal in which every states wish to 
achieve.  
 
3.5 Tax Incentive in Indonesia 
 
Tax Incentive is not a new issue in Indonesia. In 1967, Indonesia started to give tax 
holiday to attract foreign investment. Tax holiday is considered to be potential tool to 
attract foreign investment, especially in 1967 when the applicable income tax rate was 
relatively high, which reaches 60%. A year later, the facility that previously only 
applicable for foreign investor turned out to be extended to domestic investor for 
justice reason. In general, a company could enjoy tax-free facilities for six years.  
 
The provision of this tax incentive causing a complicated tax system in Indonesia. As 
a result, tax compliance rate is relatively low and the community is reluctant to know 
about the rules of taxation. Therefore, in order to produce a simpler system, tax 
authorities tried to do the reformation by abolishing various tax incentives. The 
elimination of the tax incentive was not easy. There were debates between parties 
who did not support the elimination of tax incentives and tax authority, who 
supported the elimination of the tax incentives.61 Furthermore, even after the tax 
incentives are removed, the number of foreign investment that came to Indonesia at 
that time continued to grow despite many countries still provide tax incentives.62 It is 
similar to what happened in Hong Kong, which indicates that investment will still 
enter a country as long as there is safe environment and interesting climate for 
business and market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Malcolm Gillis, Comprehensive Tax Reform: The Indonesian Experience 1981-1988, in Malcolm 
Gillis (ed), Tax Reform in Developing Countries, Duke University Press, 1989, p. 79 
62 Louis T. Wells et al, Using Tax Incentives to Compete for Foreign Investment: Are They Worth the 
Costs?, Washington DC: World Bank and The International Finance Corporation, (2001), p. 15 
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Figure 2. FDI net inflows by sector 
 
Source : Bank Indonesia 
 
There are several principal impediments to FDI inflows to Indonesia such as 
difficulties in the business environment, the complexity in Government institutions’ 
bureaucracy, skills and infrastructure. And tax rate is only a small fraction of elements 
affecting investors’ decision in choosing location to start businesses.63  
 
Based on the figure above, the Indonesian government approved several numbers of 
corporate tax incentives that have the objective to support “cluster” industries, which 
are considered as having essential role to expand regional development and to foster 
national economy. The tax incentives are available for 16 sectors, and for individual 
project it becomes accessible once the chairman of the Investment Coordinating 
Board (BKPM) has given the approval. 64  Furthermore, the government has also 
declared a temporary corporate income tax holidays for three years for new corporate 
taxpayers who invest at least IDR 1 trillion (EUR 70 million) in so-called ‘pioneer 
industries’, that includes “base metals, oil refining, textile machinery, alternative 
energy and telecommunications equipment.”65 The actions of providing tax incentives 
might potentially erode the revenue from corporate tax, distort the corporate tax, and 
create the opportunities to policy capture. Outright tax holidays are generally regarded 
as the most unfavorable form of tax incentives, considering the risk of generating 
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corruption in the tax system and might complicate tax authorities in evaluating the 
foregone revenues.66  
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4. Methods to Eliminate Double Taxation67 
 
There are three methods used to eliminate double taxation such as: Firstly, the 
exemption method which is in line with Capital Import Neutrality (CIN). CIN ensures 
a country to impose the same amount of tax on the income of foreign investors and 
local investors from equal investments made in the country. Capital Import Neutrality 
comes when the country applies the tax exemption method as its policy, hence, the 
exemption method is in line with CIN.  
The exemption method consists of two type of exemptions which are full exemption, 
which excludes foreign source income and the resident’s tax rate simply applies to 
taxpayer’s domestic source income in resident country only, and exemption with 
progression allows resident country to take the amount of exempted income into 
account when determining the tax to be imposed on the non-exempt income.  
 
The second method that can be used to eliminate double taxation is the foreign tax 
credit method that consists of full credit method and ordinary credit. In the full credit 
method, the resident country allows its resident to claim full credit for the whole 
amount of taxes paid to source country on the resident’s foreign source income. 
Ordinary credit method will calculate the way of allocating proportionate share of the 
taxpayer’s total income tax liability in resident country on its worldwide income to its 
foreign source income.  
Capital Export Neutrality (CEN) is the condition when the investors face the same 
effective domestic tax rate whether they invest at home or abroad. By doing this, the 
tax system is neutral between investors of a country investing at home or abroad 
because they are treated at home country the same way. In other words, CEN is in line 
with the tax credit method.  
 
The last method to eliminate double taxation is deduction method, which allows 
resident country to tax foreign source income and grants the taxpayers a deduction 
from their assessable income in calculating their tax liability in resident country, for 
foreign taxes paid on the foreign income. This method fails in giving full relief from 
double taxation. Furthermore, deduction method is not in line with neither CIN nor 
CEN.  
 
4.1 Matching Credit 
 
When a DTC is concluded with developing countries, matching credit is sometimes 
granted. In Matching Credit, “a notional amount of foreign taxes established in the 
relevant allocation rule or in the method article is deemed to be levied at source and is 
credited by the residence state even if the tax is not actually levied in the source state 
or a lower amount of tax is levied”.68 This matching credit is aimed to accelerate 
capital investments in the developing countries. This method also disables the 
residence state to benefit, where the investor is located, from non-taxation or reduced 
tax from the source state. In the situation where there is no matching credit 
mechanism, the residence state would directly credit less foreign tax and “would 	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therefore frustrate the non-taxation or reduced taxation by the source state”.69 All the 
benefit that comes out from this method will go to the investor, because the residence 
state will provide a credit on a notional basis irrespective of the amount that has been 
paid in the source state, which in other words means the investor will obtain the 
advantage.70 
The example of Matching Credit: “A French company derives interest arising in 
Brazil. Under the Brazil-France DTC, this interest may be taxed in Brazil. According 
to Art. XXII(2)(c) of the Brazil-France DTC, with regard to interest which has borne 
Brazilian tax in accordance with the provisions of the DTC, France shall allow its 
residents receiving such income a tax credit corresponding to the amount of Brazilian 
tax that has been paid, within the limits which the French tax establishes in such 
income. Under Art. XXII(2)(d) of the Brazil-France DTC, with regard to interest, the 
Brazilian tax shall be considered to have been levied at a minimum rate of 20%. The 
French company deriving interest arising in Brazil is thus entitled to a tax credit 
corresponding to at least 20% of the interest, irrespective of whether lower tax is 
actually levied in Brazil.”71 
 
4.2 Sparing Credit 
 
Sparing Credit method is a credit method, which based on notional amount. Under 
this method, when source state is granting an exemption or reduction, the residence 
state will grant a credit in the basis of fictitious amount of foreign taxes, which the 
source state would levy if there is no reduction or exemption were granted.72  
The Example of Sparing Credit: “A Belgian company derives interest arising in India. 
This interest may be taxed in India under the Belgium-India DTC. According to Art. 
23(3)(b)(i) of the Belgium-India DTC, when a resident of Belgium derives interest 
taxable in India in Accordance with Art.11(2) or (6), the Indian tax levied on that 
income shall be allowed as a credit against Belgian tax related to such income. 
Art.23(3)(e) of the Belgium-India DTC also provides that: “For the purposes of sub-
paragraph (b)(i) the term ‘Indian tax levied’ shall be deemed to include any amount 
which would have been payable as Indian tax under the laws of India and in 
accordance with the provisions of the Agreement for any year…”, except for some 
exemptions or reductions listed in that provisions of the DTC. Based on the above, the 
Belgian company deriving interest from India is entitled to a tax credit for the amount 
of taxes that would have been payable as Indian tax, even if no taxes are actually 
levied in India (unless the non-taxation in India is grounded on those exemptions or  
reductions that are listed in the Belgium-India DTC).”73 
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Reflecting on the “ability to pay” doctrine by Adam Smith which tax should be 
impose “in proportion to their respective abilities”74 seemed contradictive with the 
situation in Indonesia where the tax authorities are targeting individual income tax on 
low-income taxpayer while there is potentially effective source of tax which is cross-
border transactions.  
 
There are several deficiencies in the structure of tax administration in most of 
developing countries that potentially detrimental to a country’s objective of collecting 
tax when they participate in double tax treaty. Such as: “lack of computerization, 
weak external control over tax officials by the legislature, complexity and uncertainty 
in tax legislation and so forth that render tax controls less operative.”75 However, 
Indonesia has attempted to address such deficiency in tax administration when dealing 
with cross-border transactions by adopting Indonesian Mutual Agreement Procedure.  
 
4.3 Indonesian’ Mutual Agreement Procedure 
 
Indonesia has Advance Pricing Agreement as a solution to solve tax dispute 
unilaterally. Furthermore, in 2010, Indonesian Directorate General of Taxation (DGT) 
issued Minister of Finance Decree number 48/PJ./2010 which been updated with 
Minister of Finance Decree number 240/PMK.03/2014 regarding Mutual Agreement 
Procedure (MAP). MAP in Indonesia is an administrative procedure done by 
Indonesian DGT and Tax Authority from contracting party that deals with problems 
arising from Double Tax Treaty. Firstly, this procedure deals with transfer pricing 
issue, and corresponding adjustment as the result of transfer pricing correction done 
by primary adjustment produced by tax authorities in other contracting party to meet 
consistency in allocating income to prevent double taxation. Secondly, this procedure 
deals with dual residence issue where one person is considered as taxpayer in both 
jurisdictions. Thirdly, this procedure deals with Advance Pricing Agreement (APA), 
which is an agreement between Directorate General of Taxation and Taxpayers, or 
Directorate General of Taxation with tax authority from other contracting state that 
involves taxpayer.  
 
Parties that are able to request the MAP are stated in Article 3 in Indonesian MAP, 
which are: taxpayer through Directorate General of Taxation; Directorate General of 
Taxation; and tax authorities in other contracting party. MAP run by Directorate 
General of Taxation shall be conducted by the Director of Tax Regulation II who acts 
as competent authority in Indonesia. After MAP is requested, Director of Tax 
Regulation II will start the process by performing several stages starting from 
requesting supporting documents, further explanation and additional information from 
taxpayers. Based on the investigation, the Director of Tax Regulation II will decide 
whether the request of MAP can be granted or not. The shortcomings in Indonesian 
MAP can be examined from the ambiguity in Article 4 in Indonesian MAP regarding 
the time limit of MAP request, which can not be found either in Double Tax Treaty 
and domestic law and may create unlimited duration of MAP.  
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Indonesian MAP also does not enforce obligation for the competent authority to give 
decision on the outcome of the dispute. Particularly, Article 18 paragraph 3 stated that 
related to MAP request regarding transfer pricing transaction, Director Tax 
Regulation II will investigate on the existence of specific provision regarding 
‘Corresponding Adjustment’ as additional consideration to decide whether or not the 
request of MAP should be granted. Whereas, not all double tax treaty made by 
Indonesia regulate the provision of ‘Corresponding Adjustment’.76 Article 9 (3) of the 
United Nation Model Convention also stated that ‘Corresponding Adjustment’ shall 
not apply if one of the contracting parties in the primary adjustment is liable to 
penalty with respect to fraud, gross negligence or willful default. Although Indonesia 
has several challenges in conducting effective tax collecting regarding cross-border 
transactions, there is positively room for improvement. 
 
4.4 Difference in Legal System Requires Communication Tool  
 
There has been action made by several countries in the world to strengthen the power 
of tax administration in obtaining taxpayer’s information regarding their assets, which 
takes place outside the country. Bilateral agreements between countries have called 
for tax information exchange. Countries with high-tax had a goal to create the same 
level of compliance between foreign accounts and domestic accounts, however, in 
order to achieve that goal, they need automatic information exchange since 
information exchange on request was limited because it demanded for a common 
knowledge that a certain person was not reporting their tax properly, and without 
proper form of tax cooperation between tax authorities, tax collection would utterly 
depend on the report by the taxpayers who might have a tendency to under-report 
their tax. 77  United States (US) finally created FATCA (Foreign Accounts Tax 
Compliance Act) provision unilaterally which is a form of automatic information 
exchange system and is enacted on 18 March 2010, this provision requires individuals 
and foreign financial institutions in United States to report their financial accounts 
held outside the country to Internal Revenue Service (IRS).78  
 
FATCA is not an agreement between two contracting states. It is a “measure created 
by one state that put legal mandates on corporate citizens of other states.”79 This 
forms a further question on whether US law contains an infringement of other states’ 
sovereignty. US indeed has a legal control over its residents and its financial 
institutions as well as US subsidiaries and branches of foreign institutions. However, 
it will be inappropriate to justify US jurisdiction on foreign company based on that 
the foreign company has a subsidiary and branch in US.80 Professor J. Richard Harvey 
in his opinion on FATCA stated that US has the right to protect its tax base. His 
statement provoked debates on how it is well acquainted that every country has the 
right to protect its tax base, however, the exercise of protecting tax base in every 	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country should not harm or violate other country’s sovereignty.81  
 
To address the issue of infringing the sovereignty of other countries, US enters  
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGA) with other countries which essentially trough 
these bilateral agreements, FATCA are introduced to the national law of each foreign 
country who enters IGA with US and they shall enact the domestic legislation and 
require Foreign Financial Institutions (FFI) to collect information on US accounts to 
be reported to the local tax authorities. IGA finally addressed the issue of violation of 
sovereignty in the sense of the other countries voluntarily enter the negotiation with 
US.82  
 
4.5 EU Solution in fighting Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance 
 
European Union has also been aware of this problem and has already introduced 
variety of actions to address the cooperation between Member States’ tax 
administrations. There are three Directives currently active in European Union: the 
Savings Directive, the Recovery of Collection Directive, and the Automatic Exchange 
Directive.  
 
4.5.1 The Savings Directive 
 
The Council Directive 2014/48/EU, of 24 March 2014 is amending Directive 
2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments.83 This 
Directive obliges Member States to do the automatic exchange of information by 
requiring the paying agents84 to apply a ‘look-through approach’ to payments made to 
certain entities or legal arrangements established or having their place of effective 
management in certain countries or territories where Directive 2003/48/EC did not 
apply.85 
 
The Objective of Savings Directive 
The Directive has the objective to “enable savings income in the form of interest 
payments made in one Member State to beneficial owners who are individuals 
resident in another Member State to be made subject to effective taxation in 
accordance with the laws of the latter Member State” since before, there was no 
coordination of national tax systems for taxation of savings income and residents of 
Member States were considered able to avoid any form of taxation in their Member 
State of residence on interest they receive in another Member State.86  
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4.5.1.1  Procedure 
 
This Directive constitutes all Member States to force people who make interest 
payments and also other financial instruments such as interest-bearing securities and 
other indirect means of holding interest-bearing securities to provide information to 
the tax authorities, to be exchanged automatically with tax authorities from other 
Contracting State.87 Beside defining “beneficial owner: and “paying agent”. These 
Directives also provides other definitions of certain terms such as: “economic 
operator”, “place of effective management”, “subject to effective taxation”, 
“beneficial owner”, and “interest payment”.  
 
4.5.1.2 Beneficial Owner 
 
“Beneficial Owner means any individual who receives an interest payment or any 
individual for whom an interest payment is secured, unless he provides evidence that 
it was not received or secured for his own benefit”.88 
Regarding the beneficial owner, this Directive requires the paying agent to establish 
the identity of the beneficial owner. For contractual relations before 1 January 2004, 
the identity should include name and address of the beneficial owner, however, for the 
contractual relations after 1 January 2004, the information regarding the identity 
should provide name, address, date and place of birth, and also tax identification 
number or equivalent. Information about date and place of birth are required if the tax 
identification number is not available.89  
 
Not only providing tax identification numbers or equivalent, the Member States are 
also required to inform the Commission about the structure and format of the Tax 
Identification numbers, as well as other official documentation containing 
information. Member States also need to inform if any changes occur. Additionally, 
the Commission will publish the ‘Official Journal of The European Union’ as the 
guidance of the information provided.90  
 
4.5.1.3 Paying Agent 
 
This Directive requires ‘paying agent’: “The paying agent is the economic operator 
who pays interest to or secures the payment of interest for the immediate benefit of 
the beneficial owner”91 to make sure the information available to tax authorities of 
Member States where the business is established who will supply the information for 
the tax authorities in state of resident of the interest recipients.92 
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4.5.1.4 Competent Authority 
 
In this Directive, ‘competent authority’ means (a) “for Member States, any of the 
authorities notified by the Member States to the Commission, (b) for third countries, 
the competent authority for the purposes of bilateral or multilateral tax conventions 
or, failing that, such other authority as is competent to issue certificates of residence 
for tax purposes.”93 
 
4.5.1.5 Interest Payments 
 
Article 6 of Savings Directive covers broad and numerous components, which would 
not be listed as interest under domestic law.94 In this Directive, ‘interest payment’ 
means interest paid or credited to an account, relating to debt claims of every kind, 
whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate 
in the debtor’s profits, and, in particular, income from government securities and 
income from bonds or debentures, includes premiums and prizes attaching to such 
securities, bonds or debentures; penalty charges for late payments shall not be 
regarded as interest payment;95  
This Directive’s ‘interest payments’ also covers any income relating to securities of 
any kind, they could be paid or realized, or credited to an account; accrued or 
capitalized interest at the sale, and refund or redemption of the debt claims.96 
 
4.5.1.6 Intermediate Remarks 
 
From the explanation provided above, it can be acknowledged that EU has attempted 
to expand the coverage of form of taxation which is interest payments in Savings 
Directive. In order to do that, Member States are required to do the automatic 
exchange of information. It could be argued that this Directive is going to be able to 
create a effective taxation since the definition ‘beneficial owner’ in this Directive is 
specified as “individual”. One could easily escape this Directive by changing the form 
of investment into shares or transferring the funds into a trust or foundation.  
 
However, in this context, the idea of broadening the scope of taxation by enabling 
savings income in the form of interest payments could potentially help Indonesia in 
optimizing the tax collection, considering Indonesia does not have automatic 
exchange of information rule in its tax system and ‘a look-through approach’ which 
the author strongly believes that the broader the scope of taxation, the narrower the 
chance of taxpayers to avoid the tax.  
 
4.5.2 The Recovery of Collection Directive 
 
The Council Directive 2010/24/EU, of 16 March 2010 is a Directive concerning 
mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other 
measures.97 This Directive is the extension of the Mutual Assistance Directive in the 	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recovery of tax claims.98 The arrangements for mutual assistance in European Union 
had been started since it was first set out in Council Directive 76/308/EEC of 15 
March 1976 for the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund and 
agricultural levies and customs duties, and it was amended by the Council Directive 
2008/55/EC of 26 May 2008 on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating 
to certain levies, duties, and taxes and other measures, however this amendment have 
proved insufficient to meet the requirement of internal market, whereby a 
modification was needed, and the latter should be repealed by new instrument 
providing a clearer and precise rules.  
 
The Objective of Recovery Directive 
Given the increasing mobility in internal market, the Directive has the objective to 
ensure the fiscal neutrality when it allows Member States to remove discriminatory 
protective measures in responding the assistance requests in cross-border transactions 
designed to prevent fraud and budgetary loss in internal market or in other word, to 
better safeguard the financial interests of the Member States by providing more 
effective and efficient assistance in order to provide better result.99  
 
4.5.2.1 Procedure 
 
This Directive is expected to cover all forms of claims of the public authorities 
relating to taxes, duties, levies, refunds and intervention including all pecuniary 
claims and also to make sure that disparities in national laws and lack of coordination 
between contracting states will not jeopardize the operation of this Directive.100  
“The requested authority may supply the applicant authority with the information 
which the latter needs in order to recover claims arising in the applicant Member 
State and notify to the debtor all documents relating to such claims emanating from 
the applicant Member State. The requested authority may also recover, at the request 
of the applicant authority, the claims arising in the applicant Member State, or take 
precautionary measures to guarantee the recovery of these claims.”101 
 
This Directive requires the communication to be made in digital form to make the 
procedure easier and faster.102 In order to achieve the efficiency while handling the 
request of assistance from applicant authority, the requested authority can apply its 
power under its own national laws concerning the similar or the same taxes. However, 
if there are no similar or same taxes, it is then permissible to use the power provided 
under the requested authority’s national law on personal income.103  
 
In giving assistance for the applicant authority, the requested authority shall notify the 
addressee regarding all documents related to the claim in Article 2 (Scope of 
Recovery Directive) and to its recovery.104 Regarding the request of the information, 
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there are several ‘limitation’ where the requested authority is not obliged to provide 
information to the applicant authority if:  
a.   The information will not be able to obtain  
b.   The information will disclose commercial, industrial and professional 
secrets; 
c.   The information will detriment security or contrary to public policy of the 
requested Member State.105  
Article 18 also covers the limitation of the requested authority’s obligations that 
includes the economic and social situation of its own national, time limit of the 
request, and threshold of the claims.  
However, the requested authority will not be able to decline the request of the 
applicant authority on the base of the information is held by bank or financial 
institutions or related to ownerships interest in a person.106 
 
In the execution of the request, Article 13 of the Directive stated that: 
“For the purpose of the recovery in the requested Member State, any claim in respect 
of which a request for recovery has been made shall be treated as if it was a claim of 
the requested Member State, except where otherwise provided for in this Directive. 
The requested authority shall make use of the powers and procedures provided under 
the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the requested Member State 
applying to claims concerning the same or, in the absence of the same, a similar tax 
or duty, (…)”107 
 
The requested authority shall take precautionary measures in handling the request of 
the applicant authority as long as it is in accordance with its own national law. 
 
4.5.2.2 The Cost 
 
The requested authority shall seek to recover from the person concerned and retain the 
costs linked to the recovery that it incurred, in accordance with the laws and 
regulations of the requested Member State. 108  Member States also required to 
renounce all claims on each other for the reimbursement of costs arising from any 
mutual assistance they grant each other pursuant to this Directive. However, when a 
specific problem arises, the applicant and requested authorities may agree on 
reimbursement arrangements.109  
 
4.5.2.3 Language Requirements 
 
Request for assistance, standard forms for notification, and uniform instruments 
permitting enforcement shall be accompanied by translation into the official language, 
or one of the official languages of the requested Member State. The differences in 
language shall not affect the validity.110  
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4.5.2.4 Intermediate Remarks 
 
 In contrast in the EU, there is no equivalent rules in Indonesia regulating recovery of 
tax claims. This means, tax that cannot be imposed in Indonesia will not be 
guaranteed to be recovered in other countries. The power possessed by Indonesian tax 
authority and the authority of other state who has tax cooperation in Indonesia is 
limited have also resulted in the loss of potential tax revenue.  
 
The non – existence of Recovery of Collection rules in Indonesia brings uncertainty 
for the tax authority and most importantly for the state itself. Indonesia should 
consider to provide legal framework on this matter to ensure the needs to safeguard 
tax revenue in Indonesia. The urgency of having the rules that covers recovery of 
collection rules will be crucial once Indonesia is involved in cross-border transactions 
and when Indonesia establish a tax treaty with another country.   
 
4.5.3 The Automatic Exchange Directive 
 
“Proper tax assessment and recovery of tax claims in cross-border situation call for 
cooperation and especially exchange of information among the tax authorities of the 
states concerned”.111 As mentioned earlier, the countries in European Union have 
reached certain minimum standard of law enforcement in addressing Double Taxation 
problem within European Union by helping each other through the mutual assistance 
directive. Since 25 January 1988, there had been Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, which has been signed and ratified by 
certain Member States.112 This Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 
is amending Directive 2011/16/EU concerning mandatory automatic exchange of 
information in the field of taxation. Following the negotiations between United States 
and all Member States regarding FATCA, OECD released the global standard 
package for automatic exchange of financial account information in tax matters. 
Council Directive 2011/16 EU has already provided mandatory automatic exchange 
information between Member States, but the rapid growth of cross border transactions 
has made the existing Directive less effective in combating tax fraud and evasion.113  
 
The Objective of Automatic Exchange Directive 
The increasing number of unreported and untaxed income because of cross-border tax 
fraud and tax evasion resulting reduced national tax revenues have forced an 
enhancement in efficiency and effectiveness of tax collection. To minimize the cost 
and administrative burdens, Automatic Exchange Directive ensures expanded scope 
of automatic exchange of information within the Union by requiring Financial 
Institution in every Member States to implement reporting and due diligence rules. 
However, there will be category for Financial Institutions that are considered as low 
risk of being used to evade tax should be excluded for the list of financial institutions 
that are required to implement this Directive. The implementation of this Directive 
will also limit the opportunity of taxpayers of being reported on shifting assets to 
Financial Institutions that are not on the scope of this Directive. The mechanism on 
processing the information under this Directive will be proportionate to enable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Maarjana Helminen, EU Tax Law Direct Taxation, (2013) IBFD 
112 Maarjana Helminen, EU Tax Law Direct Taxation, (2013) IBFD 
113 Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards 
mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation (Automatic Exchange Directive)  
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Member States’ tax administrations to use the information effectively in order to 
address the situation where taxpayers might hide capital or evading the tax, but not to 
initiate unnecessary investigation.114 
 
4.5.3.1 Procedure 
 
Article 3 point 9 of the Directive 2011/16/EU is amended by Article 1 in this 
Directive, which explains: 
“’Automatic exchange’ means the systematic communication of predefined 
information on residents in other Member States to the relevant Member State of 
residence, without prior request, at pre-established regular intervals. In the context of 
Article 8, available information refers to information in the tax files of the Member 
State communicating the information, which is retrievable in accordance with the 
procedures for gathering and processing information in that Member State.” 
 
4.5.3.2 The Cost 
 
To minimize the costs and administrative burdens, it is necessary for the Member 
States to require their Financial Institutions to implement reporting and due diligence 
rules. Member states are anticipated to have one single list of domestically-defined 
Non-Reporting Financial Institutions and Excluded Accounts.115  
 
4.5.3.3 Intermediate Remarks 
  
Unfortunately, automatic exchange of information is not mentioned in Indonesian 
Mutual Agreement Procedure. The term of “Automatic” which in EU is defined as 
‘without prior request’ is not recognized in Indonesian legal framework. As 
previously explained, the concept of MAP in Indonesia only regulates transfer 
pricing, dual residence, and APA issues which leads to narrowed interpretation of 
cross-border transactions. This condition causing many form of cross-border 
transactions that cannot be covered by this rules.  
 
In addition, the long process of requesting the information in Indonesian MAP has 
been an impediment of the optimal information exchange. The absence of 
“automatic” concept in Indonesian MAP makes the implementation of the rules 
ineffective.  
 
4.6 Developing Countries Face Policy Issues and Implementation Challenges 
 
The report form G-20 Summit prepared by International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
OECD, UN and the World Bank stated that developing countries are facing practical 
difficulties in implementing transfer pricing rules. The difficulties are: “(a) in drafting 
clear legislation and guidance; (b) in building tax administration expertise and 
experience in transfer pricing to enable them to carry out effective audits; (c) in 
obtaining the information needed from taxpayers in order to select cases for audit or 
carry out effective audits; and (d) in obtaining public information on arm’s length 
conditions, i.e. the conditions (for example, price or profit margin) in place for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Automatic Exchange Directive, para. 9-10 
115 Automatic Exchange Directive, para. 9 
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independent enterprises conducting comparable transactions under comparable 
circumstances.”116 These difficulties were also face by developed countries, but the 
problems are “more acute” for developing countries.  
 
One of the problems faced by developing countries in implementing transfer pricing 
which are the difficulties in obtaining information from taxpayers by developing 
countries in implementing transfer pricing rules and other tax evasion issues could be 
solved by implementing the mutual assistance policy since it will force tax authorities 
from states included in bilateral tax treaties to work together and assist other related 
tax authority in sending tax-related information regarding taxpayers. However, 
implementing the mutual assistance, recovery of tax claims and savings directives 
will most likely bring its own challenges.  
 
The application of mutual assistance can be different from one state to another state. 
The different result depends on the “speed of reaction and the practices of its own tax 
administration.” 117  There are several factors that influence the attainment of the 
mutual assistance in bilateral agreements. The first is the “Practical Factors”, the 
second one is the “Legal Factors”, the third one is the assurance of reciprocity, and 
lastly, the capacity of developing country’s tax authority to obtain information.  
 
4.7 The Practical Factors 
 
There are variants of agreements in taxation, they could be bilateral agreements and 
multilateral conventions, and the most functioning conventions are those formed 
within closer jurisdiction, because the closer one country with other countries 
geographically, it tends to be the more active the cooperation. When one state is 
unaccustomed with the other contracting state’s legal system and procedure, it will 
lead to create obstacle in achieving effective cooperation.118 Or in other words: “In 
fact, the greater problem often is not differences in legal systems, but 
misunderstandings about those differences. In many instances, differences in systems 
can be overcome if both States make a concerted effort to carefully and fully explain 
the niceties of their laws to each other. Equally important, States should make 
inquiries about the other country’s legal systems whenever there is a doubt.”119 
 
4.8 Legal Factors: Quantitative and Qualitative Inadequacy of the Regulations120 
 
The secretive and complex bureaucracy and also administration system had been 
problematic obstacles that hinder countries concluded in tax treaties achieving the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 A Report to the G-20 Development working group by The IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank, 
Supporting the Development of More Effective Tax Systems”, (2011), p. 34 
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goal.121  Another common issue in developing countries is the inadequacy of the 
legislation to counter tax avoidance. Taxpayers and tax authorities often encounter 
numerous amount of legislation that is not clear in wording or not specifically explain 
the coverage on what tax should be covered creating legal uncertainty, or when a 
regulation provides that a transaction should not be done, however it does not regulate 
the other alternative transaction, the regulation will likely be insufficient.  
 
4.9 Assurance of Reciprocity 
 
Mutual assistance tends to be contemplated as a reciprocal settlement of disputes 
compared than as a effort that is done collectively to enhance the adequacy and 
harmony of domestic taxation when applied in cross-border transaction.122 However, 
when a bilateral treaty is concluded between developing country and developed 
country, it creates asymmetrical situation since the investment flows in only one 
direction.123 Regarding the flow of exchange of information, considering that there 
will be additional cost that arises as to implementing new systems to keep the 
exchange of information effective, “It is important in this regards that the connection 
between exchange information and the allocation of taxing rights in highlighted to put 
developing countries into a more powerful negotiation position vis-à-vis developed 
countries in a tax treaty negotiation”124 and that developing countries need to come up 
with greater effort in arguing the allocation of taxing right to reduce the 
asymmetry.125  
 
4.10 The Essential Elements of Transparency And Exchange of Information 
 
The essential elements of transparency and exchange of information that have been 
developed by the OECD are contained in the Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and the 2002 Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax 
Matters.126 They are: “THE 10 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF TRANSPARENCY 
AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES: 
 
A. AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION 
A.1. Jurisdictions should ensure that ownership and identity information for all 
relevant entities and arrangements is available to their competent authorities. 
A.2.  Jurisdictions should ensure that reliable accounting records are kept for all 
relevant entities and arrangements. 
A.3. Banking information should be available for all account-holders. 
 
B. ACCESS TO INFORMATION 	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International, p. 155 
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International, p. 155 
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B.1. Competent authorities should have the power to obtain and provide 
information that is the subject of a request under an EOI agreement from any person 
within their territorial jurisdiction who is in possession or control of such information. 
B.2. The rights and safeguards that apply to persons in the requested jurisdiction 
should be compatible with effective exchange information. 
 
C. EXCHANGING INFORMATION 
C.1. EOI mechanisms should provide for effective exchange of information. 
C.2. The jurisdictions’ network of information exchange mechanisms should cover 
all relevant partners. 
C.3. The jurisdictions’ mechanisms for exchange of information should have 
adequate provisions to ensure the confidentiality of information received. 
C.4.  The exchange of information mechanisms should respect the rights and 
safeguards of taxpayers and third parties. 
C.5. The jurisdiction should provide information under its network of agreements 
in a timely manner.”127 
 
4.11  Capacity of Developing Country’s Tax Administration is Limited  
 
There are several issues regarding tax administration in developing countries in 
Indonesia, particularly the tax authority. The tax authorities, who ‘woefully 
inadequate’128 are facing many priorities in their job desk. The second issue is they 
are employers who are unfamiliar with international tax avoidance issue and 
constantly preoccupied with private sector, especially the large accountancy firms. 
This issue brings pressure to the tax authorities, compounded with lack of experience, 
creating an asymmetry situation when the tax authorities are challenged by well-
prepared large companies. Furthermore, the government in developing countries may 
not have establish practice for the tax authority when they are settling the disputes 
with large taxpayers related to complex international cross-border transaction. 129 
Learning from developed countries, where disputes occasionally settled with 
discussion and arrangement between tax authorities and taxpayers, it is not 
necessarily overcome the disputes in developing countries. Additionally, when a tax 
authority is granted with wide discretion, what is potentially could happen is there 
will be a larger opportunity for corruption.130  
 
There are several aspects of domestic law mentioned in UN Model regarding Double 
Tax Treaty which may be relevant to Indonesia’s tax administration at the moment 
which are:  
1.   “Is there enough international tax expertise in the units dealing with 
international tax matters? 
2.   Are there enough resources available to apply tax treaties? 
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3.   Should certain international tax matters be dealt with by local units or by 
specialized units (such as, for instance, taxation of non-residents by 
assessment and decisions to allow withholding agents to provide tax treaty 
benefits at source)? 
4.   Are there sufficient language skills in the units dealing with international tax 
matters? 
5.   Is there a separate fiscal intelligence unit for gathering and distributing 
relevant tax information on international tax matters?”131 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Every country that enters double tax treaty should be attentive to examine the 
probability and the consequences of entering tax treaty because they potentially create 
opportunities for tax avoidance. Another issue that will likely arise is the improper 
use or abuse of tax treaties.  
 
United Nations and OECD have tried to prevent double taxation and double non 
taxation issues by their model convention which each member of the organization 
may adapt. However, double taxation and double non – taxation issue will remain 
exist since every country has different legislation and tax rates. What is left is room 
for improvement. 
 
Beside Information Exchange Directive, EU member states adopt Recovery of 
Collection Directive which enables authorities from other contracting state in the tax 
treaty to recover tax claim from or take precautionary measures to guarantee the 
recovery of these claims and the Savings Directive which provide tax authorities from 
other state greater authorization to ensure tax collection is optimal.  
 
In the mean time, Indonesian’s tax regulation regarding cross-border transaction and 
its tax treaties are still premature. There has been no significant development since its 
first tax reformation in 1983. One of the major aspect of the lesson from European 
Union’s Directives is the automatic exchange of information. Indonesian mutual 
agreement procedure only recognizes exchange of information without requiring the 
automatic exchange of information. This procedure plays important role n the 
enforcement of the exchange of information, particularly to ensure the information 
collection is effective and efficient. 
 
The aim of the study is to establish what Indonesia could learn from with EU, and it 
has been established in this study that there are some aspects in Indonesia that are not 
regulated yet, or needs to be further elaborated, and the regulation itself could be 
more explicit on defining every transaction in cross-border transactions which 
accordingly will leave no room for loopholes resulting in Indonesia loosing the right 
to tax, loosing its revenue, or it could also lead to non-double taxation.  
 
The next step is to cut out unnecessary steps in the bureaucracy that creates a very 
long process of assessing whether one request of exchanging information should be 
granted or not. Another thing that needs to be done is to make a decision on the issue 
of bank secrecy that has been an impediment to the lack of tax collection system in 
Indonesia.  
 
The concept of automatic exchange of information directive, savings directive, and 
recovery of collection directive in EU has been a clear example of how important is 
the certainty in legal framework. Without the existence of automatic exchange of 
information rule, savings rule, and recovery of collection rule in Indonesia as well as 
a clear concept of mutual agreement procedure, it will be difficult to reach the goal to 
safeguard the state’s revenue from tax. 
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